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Abstract 
The Rapid expansion of mobile Operating 
Systems has created a proportional development in 
Android malware infection targeting Android which 
is the most widely used mobile OS. factors such 
Android open source platform, low-cost influence the 
interest of malware writers targeting this mobile OS.  
Though there are a lot of anti-virus programs for 
malware detection designed with varying degrees of 
signatures for this purpose, many don’t give analysis 
of what the malware does. Some anti-virus engines 
give clearance during installations of repackaged 
malicious applications without detection. This paper 
collected 28 Android malware family samples with a 
total of 163 sample dataset. A general analysis of the 
entire sample dataset was created given credence to 
their individual family samples and year discovered. 
A general detection and classification of the Android 
malware corpus was performed using K-means 
clustering algorithm. Detection rules were written 
with five major functions for automatic scanning, 
signature enablement, quarantine and reporting the 
scan results. The LMD was able to scan a file size of 
2048mb and report accurately whether the file is 
benign or malicious. The K-means clustering 
algorithm used was set to 5 iteration training phases 
and was able to classify accurately the malware 
corpus into benign and malicious files. The obtained 
result shows that some Android families exploit 
potential privileges on mobile devices. Information 
leakage from the victim’s device without consent and 
payload deposits are some of the results obtained. 
The result calls proactive measures rather than 
proactive in tackling malware infection on Android 
based mobile devices.  
1. Introduction 
The evolution of information technology and its 
swift development of speedy transformation of wired  
and wireless communication in mobile computing 
especially smartphones have brought a proportional 
increase in malware development and attacks. 
Mobile devices today have played significant roles in 
our daily activities beyond making calls, sending 
SMS and MMS. Financial transactions such as 
mobile banking and online shopping are readily 
made easy using mobile devices.  The dramatic 
growth in popularity and usage of the Android OS is 
as a result of their high computational abilities, 
openness and low cost of the OS [13]. In addition, 
Android has created a significant impact in the 
permeation of broadband. Android has become a 
vulnerable operating system which is heavily 
targeted by malware writers across the broad 
spectrum of the society.  There are a lot of detection 
techniques proposed and developed by different 
security researchers and mobile companies to fight 
this menace. However, none of the detection 
techniques and anti-virus engines prove to be 100% 
(percent) accurate in malware detection. As powerful 
as those detection mechanisms are, many have 
significant limitations in their analytical domain. The 
design of Android security is in a way that the 
running applications are isolated in the sandbox; 
thus, prohibiting direct interaction from the system 
assets such as SMS, address book, MMS, GPS.  
Before an application is given access to the 
device resources during installation by the user, a 
proper verification check is performed by the binder 
to ensure that the application in quote meets the 
prerequisite for accessing the system resources. 
Other system resources such as activity manager, 
package manager, network state, launcher permission 
and service monitor are also guided by the binder 
both at the user and kernel space. When device is 
been infected, transactions at the binder driver are 
been intercepted by malware.  
This paper proposed a host-based detection of 
android malware by creating Linux Malware Detect 
rules on the virtual machine. This approach provides 
analytical information about the activities of the 
malware on the android device, it can also be applied 
for other types of mobile operating system. This 
paper covers both old and newest Android malware 
samples and family distributions with a span of over 
four years.  
2. Review of related literature 
This section provided a brief related literature on 
some of the related works that were carried out on 
the Android malware.  
Dimensionality reduction approach used in the 
study of [2] extracted malware features when APK 
files were monitored under random projection. 
Manifest files and Dalvik [19] executables were 
filtered using a logistic classifier. The activities 
performed by the malware was however not 
significantly identifiable. However, there was a 
pragmatic substantial reduction within large group of 
malware hashes with an initial step of pre-
processing. Detecting android malware by looking at 
the device application packages, permission and 
system calls were performed in the study of [18].  
The research of [3, 4, 5] looked at how malware can 
be avoided by looking at the installation permission 
spectrum and analysis of the application package 
before installation before the data availability in the 
application enhances detection with systematized 
prevalence [8, 9, 10, 11].  
The study of [6] investigated how Android 
malware can be detected by close surveillance for 
overlapping their un-dynamic attributes. The study of 
[7, 14] applied visualization and disassembly to 
inspect Android malware chromatic similitude. The 
result shows that some Android malicious packages 
exhibit similar attributes to other families and has 
high propensity of evading detection in virtual 
environments especially. 
3. Methodology 
The detection methodology defined in this work 
uses dynamic approach, meaning that the malware 
sample was actually executed. The selected sample 
files were run in an isolated virtual environment and 
their behavior was subjected to observation and 
analysis. Due to the danger of malware, the 
methodology was separated into different approaches 
ranging from installation and configuration of tools 
and services. Details of the methodological approach 
is provided in the subsections below.   
3.1 System setup 
The experimental design of this system was based 
on some components and services. The setup lab was 
designed with open source tools which have the 
ability to extract Android Apps libraries and 
resources. The safety of the physical machine was 
ensured by isolating from the real machine and 
physical resources.  The system setup and 
configuration were performed on Bionic Beaver 
which is an ubuntu codename for version 18.04 of 
the ubuntu Linux-based operating system. The 
structure of the experiment was based on different 
security open source tools which enhance application 
feature extractions during execution. The configured 
tools have ability for scanning, monitoring and 
detecting significant malware dynamic features 
ranging from battery consumption, GRP locations 
and others.  
Figure 1. System setup for detection and analysis process 
3.2 Dependencies 
For the configuration to achieve the research aim, 
some services where installed and configured on the 
virtual machine. The system was designed with 
dependencies for repackaging and unpacking 
Android applications running on the devices. Python 
version 3.6.5, ClamAv, volatility, chkrootkit, rhunter 
and Linux Malware Detect (LMD) were installed as 
services for specific actions. The detected android 
malware file was then exported to virus total for 
analysis.  LMD scans malware and other threats in a 
host-based environment [15] and behavioral 
monitoring [17]. It uses both HEX and MD5 hashes 
to generate the required signature from ClamAv for 
malware features extraction which are derivatives of 
malware files from users. In this experiment, the 
rules were written in five different segments after 
download and installation.  It has unlimited 
capability to detect and analyse 8,888 malware 
hashes of Trojans, viruses, rootkits and other threats.  
The cron.daily dependency helps in updating 
daily emerging signatures with constant variable 
release and changelog. Five most significant 
segments of the detection rules are summarily 
presented below (see Table 1 for details). 
i. Setting manual email scan reports for 
enabling malware alert. 
ii. Signature files for scanning multiple of 
weekly released malware with different 
signatures. 
iii. Scan options to specify maximum file sizes 
that can be scanned per time interval. 
iv. Quarantine segment for suspending 
suspected files. 
v. Analysis mode for checking obfuscated files 
in an encoding mode.  
Table 1. LMD rules for detection 
Functions                        Rule Explanation  
Setting manual email scan reports 
Enable signature  
Scan options   
Quarantine  
Analysis 
# ' create an email address called 
christfavour783@gmail.com'. 
# [0 = disabled, 1 = enabled] 
email_alert="1" 
email_addr="christfavour783@gmail.com" 
email_subj="Android malware alerts for 
$christfavour783 -$(date +%Y-%M-%d)" 
email_ignore_clean="1" 
# Enabled as new signatures a released multiple times 
per-week. 
autoupdate_signatures="1" 
autoupdate_version="1" 
autoupdate_version_hashed="1" 
cron_prune_days="21" 
import_config_url="" 
import_config_expire="43200" 
import_custsigs_md5_url="" 
import_custsigs_hex_url="" 
# The maximum directory depth that the scanner will 
search. 
scan_max_depth="15" 
scan_min_filesize="24" 
scan_max_filesize="2048k" 
scan_hexdepth="65536" 
scan_hexfifo="1" 
scan_hexfifo_depth="524288" 
scan_clamscan="1"scan_tmpdir_paths="/tmp /var/tmp 
/dev/shm /var/fcgi_ipc" 
# The default quarantine action for malware hits    
quarantine_hits="1" 
quarantine_clean="1" 
quar_susp="1" 
quarantine_suspend_user="0" 
quarantine_suspend_user_minuid="500" 
#This is useful as obfuscated code is often stored 
using encoding methods 
string_length_scan="0" 
string_length="150000" clam av="1" 
3.3 Machine Learning algorithm  
Machine learning [20] generally abbreviated as 
ML is a branch of the Artificial Intelligence which 
deals with computerisation of data logical 
prototypical construction. ML enables systems to 
identify and classify data arrays, making decisions 
that are minimally based on the interference of 
humans. Machine learning can be supervised, 
unsupervised, reinforced and semi-supervised 
learning. Supervised machine learning deals with 
training dataset to perform some regression or 
classification functions using algorithms such as 
decision tree, random forest Naïve Bayes, nearest 
neighbour, linear regression, neural networks.  
The unsupervised ML searches and divides dataset 
of a particular sample based on its algorithm for 
mining, detecting, describing patterns for data 
grouping. The basic feature of this learning is that 
the target variables are usually not available. 
Commonly used unsupervised algorithms are 
associated rule and k-means clustering algorithms. 
This study used unsupervised K-means algorithm to 
classify the malware corpus. K-means classification 
produced different clusters on the malware dataset at 
each iteration phase of training.  
4. Experiment 
A sizeable Android malware dataset was obtained 
from Contagiodump project [1] for this study. The 
dataset was collected with the file name “Android-
malware-master.zip” having a total size of 163 
malware with 26 different malware families 
including benign genuine Android applications. 
Using Enguage Digitizer [16], the graphical 
illustration of the dataset distribution of the malware 
families was generated (see figure 3). In the 
distribution, it is observed that there is high degree of 
entropy in the sample size. Due to this visible 
distinctiveness in the elevation of this files’ high 
level of entropy, other applications will be 
considered for detection in the experiment, but much 
credence will be given to the recent family to 
discover their determined characteristics.  
Figure 3. Distribution of the malware corpus using 
enguage digitizer 
4.1 Malware Corpus Timeline  
It is very important to know when a malware 
family immerged or was discovered in order to 
determined when the payload effects on the 
vulnerable device is been patched. Using 
Androguard, the malware corpus timeline was 
carefully acquired by inspecting the 26 malware 
families with 163 sample apk files. 
Table 2. Dataset timeline consisting 26 android malware families and 163 sample files. 
Android Malware APKs Discovered 
Date 
Fave-Av-Reader 9 2013-08-31 
Plapka 4 2013-09-07 
Simplocker 
Rouge_Skype 
Dendroid 
Dsencrypt 
BreakBotleneck 
Candy_Corn 
TowelRoot 
Spy 
Simack 
1 
1 
3 
2 
54 
2 
1 
5 
2 
2013-09-07 
2013-09-07 
2013-12-20 
2014-06-03 
2014-07-02 
2014-01-26 
2014-11-30 
2015-01-23 
2015-02-21 
Jssmsers 
Benews 
Braintest 
Feabme 
Xbot 
Rumms 
Krep 
Triada 
Descarga 
Mazar_Bot 
Rootnik 
FacebookOtp 
TrenMicro 
Agent.JI 
Fonefee.b 
Total samples 
14 
2 
21 
2 
2 
7 
2 
11 
6 
2 
4 
1 
2 
2 
1 
163 
2015-02-21 
2015-07-12 
2015-08-21 
2015-04-16 
2015-12-28 
2016-03-14 
2016-05-23 
2016-03-05 
2016-05-08 
2016-11-04 
2016-11-24 
2017-02-26 
2016-12-02 
2017-02-17 
2017-04-20 
4.2 Detection and feature extraction 
Feature extractions from the dataset were done by 
installing the applications on 6.0.1 Android version 
through the root directory of the detection engine. 
This required authentication to reload the system 
services upon the virtual machine for execution. The  
basic authentication required was the password (see 
figure 4a), the permission that every application 
requires before installation on any device. After 
granting permission for applications installations, the 
system detected immediately that a change in the 
system privacy modification was tempered with and 
generated a warning signal when the account check 
was performed (see figure 4b).   
Fig. 4. (a)Required Authentication Fig 4. (b) Performing account check
Fig.4. (c) LMD captured detection results 
4.3 Classifying malware corpus using 
K-Means  
To find the similarity group in the Android 
malware data set and effectively classify the malware 
corpus K-means algorithm [12] was implemented in 
this work. This is an unsupervised machine learning 
algorithm used to group individual android 
application based on similarity in the population. K 
number of clusters were specified in the algorithm. 
Cluster 1 represented the group of benign 
applications in the data set while cluster 2 
represented the malicious applications for 
classification in the data set.  
Algorithm: K-Means clustering Algorithm  
1. Select K points, set of points X1--- Xn
2. Randomly initialise the center point C1---Ck
3. Assign malware corpus to the closest cluster centroids 
4. Compute the center point of each cluster
5. Repeat step 2 to 3 until no more change to the center points 
6. Exit 
Figure 5. Classifying benign and malicious applications at each iteration 
The algorithm was permitted to specify the closest, 
widest and marginal delta points at its space to 
observe and then append to each cluster at each 
iteration phase. The intention was to maximize the 
degree between the clusters and the given 
observation. If the delta point between a point to the 
two centroids is the same, it means the point could 
belong to the same group, thus classified as benign 
or malicious.  At each iteration, the delta points 
between the clusters were systematically mirrored to 
group the dataset with similar attributes. 
4.4 Metrics for performance evaluation  
The following metrices were used for performance 
evaluation of the classification system.  
Accuracy: This shows the ratio of the overall 
integral value of the applications sample which are 
classified in a correct measure as malicious or 
benign.  
Precision: This is the ratio of the actual malicious 
applications that are correctly classified or detected 
to the total number of the applications that the LMD 
model detected as malicious.  
Recall:  This is a ratio of true positive to its function 
and the additive value of the false negative impact. 
Confusion Matrix: This is the applications which 
are classified correctly or incorrectly. Our confusion  
matrix (see table) summarised our classification 
model performance on the collected Android 
malware dataset. The true values with their 
respective derivatives are also represented 
accordingly. The integer of the malicious 
applications the LMD model correctly detected as 
malicious (True positive). The integer of the benign 
applications the LMD model incorrectly detected as 
malicious (false positive). Also, the integer of the 
benign applications the LMD model correctly 
classified as not malicious (True Negative). Finally, 
the integer of the malicious applications the LMD 
model incorrectly classified as not malicious (False 
Negative). 
Table 3: Confusion matrix 
Measure  Value  Derivation  
Sensitivity 0.7027 TPR = TP / (TP+FN) 
Specificity 0.7053 SPC = TN / (FP+TN)
Precision
Negative Predictive Value
False positive rate 
False Discovery Rate
False Negative Rate
Accuracy  
F-Measure (F1 Score)
0.73581 
0.6700
0.29472 
0.2642 
0.2973 
0.7039 
0.7189
PPV = TP / (TP+FP) 
NPV = TN / (TN+FN) 
FPR = FP / (FP+TN) 
FDR = FP / (FP+TP) 
FNR = FN / (FN+TP) 
ACC = (TP+TN) / (P+N) 
F1 = 2PT / (2PT+FP+FN) 
The relationship between the sensitivity and 
specificity in the random classification gives an 
illustration of the Android malware detection by 
sequence in a custom analogous to the traditional 
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve.  
Figure 6. 
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5. Evaluation  
The result analysis for this research was focused 
on the latest discovered Android malware family 
(Fonfee.b) in the Dataset which has the package 
name com.c101421042723.apk. The choice to 
concentrate on Fonefee.b in this study is to give an 
in-depth study about the research. Most importantly, 
Fonefee.b is more recent and might not have been 
patched probably. Another factor of interest is the 
high level of randomness and the information gain at 
the leaf nodes of Fonefee.b file during the research. 
The analysis was focused on permissions requested, 
files accessed, contacted urls, network connectivity, 
payload deposition and battery depletion by the 
malware.  
5.1 Permissions requested and URLs 
contacted
Malicious applications have little leverage on 
Android devices if their permissions grants are 
controlled or constrained by users. The result 
obtained showed that the application requested 
different privileges when permitted to be installed in 
the root directory of the application. The research 
found that the malware established a connectivity 
with different C&C servers where http requests were 
made and contents such as images where uploaded at 
the background to those addresses without the 
victim’s responsiveness (see 6b for details).  In this 
study, permissions requested by the malware and the 
url contacted by the sample malicious application 
were shown in figure 6a and 6b respectively. Intent 
filters by category indicated that the malware is a 
launcher with the ability of sending SMS without 
victim’s knowledge. Other infection capabilities of 
this malware were discovered in the bundled files of 
the device’ META-INF/MANIFEST.MF, popup and 
automatic download are some special characteristics 
of this malware. 
Figure 7. (a)Permission requested 
Figure 7. (b) Illustrating potential privileges 
exploited by Fonefee.b android malware 
The permission requested remotely accessed files 
on the victim’s device without his awareness. 
Accessed files include media, pictures, phone text 
messages and images. 
Figure 8. Files accessed by fonefee.b malware   
5.2 Network Communication 
Fonefee.b was found to be secretly 
communicating and uploading pictures to the 
particular IP address of a country. The malware 
loaded and invoked method 
android.net.ConnectivityManager.getMobileData
Enabled for background data connectivity and 
android.net.conn.CONNECTIVITY_CHANGE 
for synchronization mechanisms respectively. In 
addition, background calls, uploading of images and 
media files were made through the influence of the 
malware to a country ip address (name on hold for 
security reasons). The relationship between the 
contacted domains, compressed parents, bundled 
files and the contacted ip address of the country 
was obtained.  
Fig. 9. Malware Activity connectivity 
5.3 Payload  
Payload is another interesting feature to look for 
when analysing malware. These are private text 
containing malware for victim’s data encrypted, 
deletion and spamming. Fonefee.b deposited a 
payload in the device with an encrypted submitname 
filename”cd9404f21e4bc52e477e62037db537c4239
b9afcf1d490e1ea75d1c5aefb47ef”. This was 
primarily for performing phishing attacks while 
resident in the device. Part of the message was 
obtained during the analysis which was executed in 
the particular offset of the device address. 
Figure 11. Payload  
Figure 11. (b) ELF Section Location of the  
5.4 Location monitoring 
Fonefee.b was found to is an Android Trojan 
capable of monitoring and tracking the victim’s 
device by taking the coordinates of the victim’s 
latitude. At the time of this experiment, the location 
of the device was captured at latitude 51.5595N and 
1.7910W respectively. This ability of the Trojan to 
track the device location and send the details to the 
C&C server of the hacker can be used to launch 
terrorism or personal attacks on the individual. This 
is indeed a dangerous Trojan exhibiting almost all 
the actions performed by the rest of malware class. 
Fig. 12. Location tracking  
5.5 Battery depletion  
The consumption rate per activity was monitored 
using volatility tool. The ratio of energy 
consumption to the bandwidth was not proportional 
due to the draining effect exerted by the malware. 
The battery depletion was as a range of many 
activities performed at the background by the 
malware. The battery life of mobile device is 
determined by the rating of the input current of the 
phone in relation to the load current the circuit holds. 
By inference, the battery capacity of a mobile device 
under normal condition will be high when the load 
activities on the system are low. However, some 
external forces such as malware make allowances 
which the device battery life can be affected 
especially when the runtime is not equivalent to the 
ratio of load per second running on the device.  
6. Conclusion  
The results obtained from this study confirmed 
visibly the sombre menace malware has posed on 
Android platform operating system. There are many 
anti-virus programs modelled to tackle this threat. 
However, the empirical examination of our research 
revealed that many of these software lack efficacies 
in detecting malware which emerged with unknown 
signature by the existed anti-virus programs. 
Fonefee.b was only detected by 38 out of 59 anti-
virus engines. The rest of the engines failed to 
extract the signature of the sample malware. in 
addition, more than one cryptographic function and 
hash values were used while writing this malware 
program. By implication, this has the ability to 
exhibit metamorphic attributes to evade detection by 
many detection techniques through self-repackaging.  
Exploitation to gain privilege escalation as a 
result of the fragmentation problem observed in 
Android operating system can enhance mobile 
vulnerability risk before a security patch is initiated. 
It is observed in this research that Android lacks firm 
rheostat on some of the APIs such as 
“sendTextMessage” in order to hinder premium-rate 
sending of SMS at the background when affected 
with malware. Most of the permissions permitted by 
malicious applications have the ability of affecting 
the entire Android OS configuration and META-
INF/MANIFEST.MF. It is evident that all the 
potentially exploited privileges where a function of 
this vulnerability.  Some of the domains that were 
contacted include lm.dmsd.net, sdk2.cmvideo.cn and 
vsbbc.com using a mobile communication addresses 
221.181.100.84 of the country’s network.  
In conclusion, the results obtained and presented 
in this paper provided a detailed characteristics and 
threats that malware posed on users of Android 
based devices and information security at large. 
These threats range from malware payloads 
deposition, information harvest, privilege escalation, 
private communication without the victim’s 
awareness, upload of the device’s data contents to 
C&C servers and host of others. These outcomes are 
indeed graving and call for advance security 
measures to be implemented to provide a reactive 
defense mechanism on the OS rather than proactive 
defense. Future research can be carried out on using 
neural networks algorithms such as Bayesian 
regularization to determine the accuracy rate of both 
the target and output of malware classification 
sample. The researcher intends to carry further 
research on how to classify permissions request 
based on their threat and protection level. The 
researcher intends to perform further research on 
how to provide a security perimeter defence around 
the Google Bouncer in order to fight Android 
malware infections.  
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